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Abstract 
From a theoretical point of view, result-based agri-environmental payments are clearly 
preferable to action-based payments. However, they suffer from two major practical 
disadvantages: costs of measuring the results and payment uncertainty for the participating 
farmers. In this paper, we propose an alternative design to overcome these two disadvantages 
by means of modelling (instead of measuring) the results. We describe the concept of model-
informed result-based agri-environmental payments (MIRBAP), including a hypothetical 
example of payments for the protection and enhancement of soil functions. We offer a 
comprehensive discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of MIRBAP, showing 
that it not only unites most of the advantages of result-based and action-based schemes, but also 
adds two new advantages: the potential to address trade-offs among multiple policy objectives 
and management for long-term environmental effects. We argue that MIRBAP would be a 
valuable addition to the agri-environmental policy toolbox and a reflection of recent 
advancements in agri-environmental modelling. 
Keywords: agriculture; agri-environmental policy; governance; incentives 
JEL codes: Q18, Q24, Q52, Q58 
1 Introduction 
Agricultural production is entangled in several challenges that require appropriate design of 
institutional responses. Agriculture depends on an intact, functioning environment; but it also 
causes environmental damage. On the one hand, farmers are heavily affected by environmental 
change, e.g. climate change (Challinor et al., 2014; Peichl et al., 2019) and land degradation 
(Nkonya et al., 2016). On the other hand, agricultural production is a major source of multiple 
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environmental pressures, including greenhouse gas emissions, soil erosion, ground and surface 
water pollution and landscape degradation (Campbell et al., 2017). Despite the recognition that 
agriculture is generating serious environmental problems, they persevere and in many cases are 
worsening (Springmann et al., 2018). This is often due to inadequate specification of property 
rights and the associated asymmetrical, inefficient and potentially unjust distribution of costs 
and benefits among farmers and other members of society (Bartkowski et al., 2018). From an 
economic point of view, agricultural produce and associated profits are private benefits, 
whereas the environmentally harmful impacts of agriculture are externalities (public bads to 
society and other stakeholders) that are not borne by farmers and hence in need of 
internalization in farmers’ decisions. This includes the need to incentivize the provision of 
public goods (positive externalities such as carbon storage in soils), which risk being 
underprovided if there is no compensation to the farmer. 
The most common policy instrument in this context is agri-environmental payments, a form of 
payments for ecosystem services (PES) (Engel, 2016): farmers voluntarily enter contracts under 
which they agree to change their management in a way that is assumed to benefit the 
environment. In exchange, they receive pre-defined payments. There are two general variants 
of agri-environmental payments – action-based and result-based schemes.1 Action-based 
schemes, which are much more widespread today, offer farmers a uniform payment within a 
specified area or region such as a watershed for adopting specific management practices or 
environmentally beneficial actions. Result-based schemes, on the other hand, offer payments 
conditional on achieving a result, i.e. a quantifiable environmental objective, while the choice 
of actions to achieve the result can be up to the participating farmers. The defining characteristic 
of a result-based scheme is that the payment is based on a quantified result, and therefore 
implies the possibility of farmers receiving different payments for the same actions. 
Most agri-environment and climate measures within the European Union’s (EU) Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) framework are action-based payment schemes (Burton and Schwarz, 
2013). A growing body of literature indicates that these schemes perform poorly; while the 
CAP’s agri-environmental programmes have been shown to slightly improve the state of 
European agroecosystems (e.g. Batáry et al., 2015), action-based schemes lack the important 
sensitivity to local conditions (Kleijn et al., 2011) and they often fail in providing the ecological 
benefits they are supposed to bring about (Burton and Schwarz, 2013; Dupraz and Guyomard, 
                                                 
1 Note that different terms are used in the literature: action-based can be referred to as input- and measure-based 
or action-oriented payments/schemes, while result-based are referred to as performance-, outcome-, output-, 
success-based or -oriented payments/schemes, or objective-driven or payment-by-result schemes. 
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2019). Moreover, they are often cost-ineffective (Wätzold et al., 2016). Overall, the literature 
indicates that the lack of evidence-based links between the implementation of particular 
practices on particular farms is the root of the poor performance of action-based schemes.  
A large body of literature exists on the relative strengths and weaknesses of action-based and 
result-based agri-environmental payments (Börner et al., 2017; Burton and Schwarz, 2013; 
Engel, 2016; Engel et al., 2008). This literature shows that result-based payments are clearly 
preferable from a theoretical point of view because they provide incentives to farmers to enrol 
the most suitable land, thus ascertaining goal attainment and preventing adverse selection; they 
have low informational requirements for the regulator (which, however, goes along with 
potentially high information rents for the farmers (White and Hanley, 2016)); they are cost-
effective and dynamically efficient by providing incentives to innovate and drive down the costs 
of goal attainment over time. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that by being less prescriptive 
and by rewarding inventiveness they may increase farmer engagement and lead to an 
internalization of the scheme’s goals by the farmers (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Why then are 
not result-based schemes more prevalent?  
Result-based payments score significantly worse than action-based payments in terms of 
practicability, which explains their low prevalence in practice: first, they require, ostensibly, 
sophisticated monitoring and measurement of results (Zabel and Roe, 2009); second, they are 
less attractive to farmers than action-based payments due to the associated uncertainty of 
payment, as “an individual’s performance also depends on external environmental effects such 
as weather influences” (Zabel and Roe, 2009, p. 131; see also Drechsler, 2017; Derissen and 
Quaas, 2013). Furthermore, conventional result-based payments provide incentives to enrol 
land where the required effect is already fulfilled or close to fulfilment (Uthes and Matzdorf, 
2013), as usually the payments are not based on a change compared to the status quo, but rather 
on the absolute level of achievement.2 Nonetheless, result-based agri-environmental payments 
are widely considered the way forward in Europe (e.g. Cullen et al., 2018; Mann, 2018). For 
instance, the European Commission has issued a handbook on designing and implementing 
result-based schemes within the CAP (Keenleyside et al., 2014).  
The main obstacle posed by result-based schemes compared to action-based schemes is 
therefore practical: the measurement of the results of farmers’ chosen measures. In the context 
                                                 
2 According to Herzon et al. (2018), most result-based schemes provide payments on the basis of “the opportunity 
costs of the management that is considered most likely to be required to achieve the results” (p. 350). In fact, this 
is considered a legal requirement according to the WTO “Green Box” rules (Hasund and Johansson, 2016) and in 
line with EU’s own Rural Development Regulation, Article 28 (Colombo and Rocamora-Montiel, 2018). 
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of nonpoint-source pollution, Sidemo-Holm et al. (2018) have demonstrated that the practical 
shortcomings of result-based agri-environmental payment schemes can be alleviated by using 
models instead of direct measurement to determine the farmer’s achieved result (see also 
Talberth et al., 2015). In this paper, we aim to develop further the idea of using modelling for 
solving the measurement problem and to demonstrate how uncertainties can be reduced on both 
sides of the transaction. To do this, we propose the design of a model-informed, result-based 
agri-environmental payment (MIRBAP) scheme and discuss how it would combine “the best 
of both worlds” of action-based and result-based payments. Furthermore, we provide a 
framework of how modelling and smart infrastructure can be combined for possible 
applications in the context of sustainable land management, and demonstrate its applicability 
with a concrete example in the area of soil function modelling and soil management. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we elaborate on the relation of measurement 
and modelling in the context of result-based schemes. In section 3 we outline the general idea 
of a model-informed result-based payment scheme and illustrate it with a hypothetical 
application in the context of soil functions. In section 4 we offer a comprehensive discussion of 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of our design proposal. In section 5 we conclude and 
suggest some areas for future research. 
2 Measuring versus modelling results 
Typically, result-based schemes are taken to mean schemes that are based on actual 
measurement of environmental results through monitoring. Consequently, in situations where 
it is infeasible to measure results directly due to either the lack of a perfect object of measure 
(e.g. P concentration in water) or high cost of measurements at the individual farm or field level 
(e.g. N concentrations in tile drains), it is also assumed that a result-based scheme is infeasible. 
However, if a suitable proxy for measuring the environmental result is available, then this can 
solve the measurement problem, and open the way for broader application of result-based 
schemes. 
So far, result-based agri-environmental schemes in the EU have adopted the first strategy for 
overcoming the measurement problem, by remunerating farmers based on an indicator as a 
proxy for the environmental result, usually biodiversity (see Table A1). Since biodiversity is 
usually defined by a complexity of factors, it has proven impracticable (i.e. it is infeasible or 
too costly) to measure explicitly the impact of farming practices on biodiversity per se. Instead, 
farmers’ payments for biodiversity conservation are based on indicators of results rather than 
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farmers’ specific actions. The indicators include populations of particular species whose 
presence and abundance are known to correlate with a wider range of taxa. A conclusion that 
can be drawn from the EU inventory of result-based schemes is that these schemes are not 
dependent on measurement per se, but on indicators or proxies that have predictable 
relationships with the environmental objective. So far, result-based schemes in Europe are all 
targeting biodiversity – while other environmental public goods such as soil functions and 
regulating ecosystem services (e.g. water quality or flow regulation) are only addressed by 
means of action-based schemes (if at all). 
In cases where the feasibility or cost of measurement is the barrier to result-based schemes, 
modelling offers a solution. In a model-informed result-based payment scheme as described in 
detail in the following section, environmental results are predicted rather than measured. 
Models can synthesize knowledge about agroecosystems and process that knowledge to predict 
environmental benefits that are not feasible to measure, e.g. the influence of agricultural 
management on the dynamics of soil functions (Vogel et al., 2018) and nonpoint-source 
pollution (Strauch et al., 2013). In order to do so, the model needs to describe the particular 
system’s state and dynamics and its alteration by external factors (e.g. agricultural practices and 
climate), and thus provide predictions of the environmental effects of management actions. 
Models can of course never perfectly represent a complex system such as the interface between 
agriculture and the environment. There are always things going on in such a system that cannot 
be modelled because of data and resource shortages, and inherent stochasticity. How well a 
model resembles reality is revealed by the uncertainty of its predictions. It is therefore desirable 
that model predictions have as low uncertainty as possible when used for policy purposes, such 
as result-based payment schemes. In contrast, measured results are ideally true values. The only 
uncertainty lies in the accuracy of the measurement methods – which may be large depending 
on the availability of measurement theory and technology. However, as discussed above, 
existing result-based payments are not based on measured results, but rather on indicators. 
Indicators imply high levels of uncertainty, just as modelled predictions, with respect to the 
reliability and stability of the relationship between the indicator and the desired result. 
Compared to measured indicators, models have the advantage that they can be used to estimate 
the uncertainty of the predictions. 
To predict environmental benefits with the lowest possible uncertainty, models need to include 
all relevant processes, functional relationships and dependencies. Otherwise, their predictive 
power will be limited (Evans et al., 2013). Model development requires expert knowledge. Data 
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is required for model building, calibration, and evaluation. Still, measuring environmental 
benefits directly requires far more data in comparison. Expert knowledge is required to select 
reasonable indicators and to interpret their meaning. 
Before estimating results with models, it has to be decided whether the predictions for the 
eligible management practices are made with acceptably low uncertainty. A threshold for 
acceptable uncertainty can be decided upon initially, and as long as that threshold is exceeded, 
the model needs to be revised until the uncertainty is at an acceptable level, or otherwise 
abandoned. This process is similar to when evaluating the measurability of indicators in 
conventional result-based payments schemes. Instead of appraising the capacity of farmers, 
controllers and measurement tools, the modelling accuracy and precision are considered. 
3 Model-informed result-based agri-environmental payments 
From a theoretical point of view, result-based schemes are superior to action-based schemes 
(see section 1). However, from a practical perspective, result-based schemes suffer from two 
main shortcomings, both of which are broadly related to measurement: first, there is the general 
challenge to measure at acceptable cost the results whose realization is to be remunerated; and 
second, the result-based payment constitutes a source of uncertainty for participating farmers. 
The gist of the present article’s argument is that both shortcomings can be overcome by means 
of modelling, though at a certain cost in terms of outcome uncertainty. In this section, we lay 
out a design of a model-informed result-based agri-environmental payment (MIRBAP) scheme. 
First, we present the conceptual idea in a general sense; subsequently, we illustrate it using the 
example of a hypothetical MIRBAP scheme targeting soil functions. 
3.1 Conceptual proposal 
The core idea is that, instead of using ex-post indicator measurements to determine the 
achievement of results, a MIRBAP scheme would employ models to predict the results.  These 
predicted environmental effects would then be the basis for determining payments. In what 
follows, we elaborate on how the information would flow between different inputs at different 
stages of a MIRBAP implementation, including modelling, farmer’s choices, results, and 
payments. Furthermore, we employ the idea of an integrated model-software application to 
sketch out what an actual implementation may look like.  
Firstly, models need to be fed with spatially explicit data describing agronomic, ecological and 
biophysical features of the land, e.g. landscape structure, field size, soil type, hydrology and 
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crop rotation, that are needed to predict the effects of management on environmental outcomes 
(Fig. 1, step 1). Secondly, the models are used to predict the effects of a set of management 
actions, e.g. reduced tillage, mowing dates, buffer strips and linear natural elements, in terms 
of spatially explicit environmental outcomes, e.g. changes in the provision of soil functions or 
biodiversity (Fig. 1, step 2). Thirdly, the modelled environmental outcomes are used as a basis 
for determining payments (Fig. 1, step 3). This entails that farmers are presented with payment 
offers for a suite of spatially explicit options of different actions (and their intensity) from which 
they can choose for their farm. Fourthly, the farmers choose one or more of the arrangement of 
actions (practices) according to their own preferences and knowledge about their fields, e.g. 
soil productivity, cost structures, profitability, and other types of motivation (Fig. 1, step 4). 
We suggest that this step can be facilitated with a software application that provides a graphical 
user interface (cf. Fales et al., 2016; Sturm et al., 2018). Such a software application, either 
web-based or mobile, could make the range of possible management choices under a particular 
scheme more accessible to the user (the farmer). Given the spatially explicit data input and the 
management choice by the farmer, the MIRBAP application would provide the farmers with 
predictions about environmental outcomes and entailed payments. Fifth and lastly, the scheme 
should be continually validated and (if necessary) updated to improve the accuracy of predicted 
results and effectiveness in terms of environmental outcomes (Fig. 1, step 5). This should 
include accounting for changes in land use which follow farmers’ participation in the MIRBAP, 
e.g. effects on the local hydrology from planting a hedge, and validating with environmental 
monitoring at a larger scale. 
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Figure 1: Schematic outline of a model-informed result-based agri-environmental payment (MIRBAP) scheme 
From a conceptual point of view, a MIRBAP scheme constitutes a form of contract between 
society and participating farmers (Hagedorn, 2008). Society can benefit from the provision of 
(public) ecosystem services by the farmers and the agroecosystems they manage. Taking the 
farmers’ freedom of choice into account, society (and the regulator on society’s behalf) make 
an “offer” for the provision of specified ecosystem services (in the widest sense). Within a safe 
virtual space of a smart application, farmers can experiment with different options and pick an 
action or a set of actions that they prefer most, be it because of monetary pay-off, costs, 
environmental quality, or any other criteria such as intrinsic motivation. The software 
application would thereby become a decision-support tool to allow the farmers and regulators 
to make informed decisions under reduced uncertainty (for further discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages, see section 4). In other words, the farmer implements the action and receives 
a predefined, certain payment contingent upon performing the action chosen, based on ex-ante 
model prediction and subject to a potential control by the regulator. This entire scheme can be 
re-evaluated and improved over time with regard to four main elements: quality and resolution 
of the input data, model prediction accuracy and precision, the set of available measures, and 
the corresponding payment levels. 
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3.2 MIRBAP scheme example 
There cannot realistically be one model for all agri-environmental payment schemes – rather, 
for each specific context, a specific model is required. Currently, agri-environmental policy 
instruments directly addressing soils and the functions they provide are scarce in the EU 
(Ronchi et al., 2019; Vrebos et al., 2017). As already mentioned in section 2, virtually all 
existing result-based agri-environmental schemes in Europe are targeting biodiversity. Given 
the complexity and heterogeneity of soil systems, action-based schemes are likely to be quite 
ineffective in improving the provision of soil functions. At the same time, soil functions are 
difficult to measure on a large scale (e.g. Drobnik et al., 2018). Accordingly, MIRBAP schemes 
have a very large potential in the context of soils (Bartkowski et al., 2018; Vogel et al., 2018). 
In this section we present an example of a modelling approach that could (hypothetically) be 
the basis for a MIRBAP scheme in the context of soil functions. The example is based on a 
modelling framework currently under development within the German large-scale project 
BonaRes – Soil as a Resource for the Bioeconomy. We explain and discuss the steps depicted 
in Figure 1 in this particular context, with an emphasis on Steps 1 and 2. We do not include 
Steps 4 and 5, as they become relevant only in an actual application of MIRBAP in the real 
world. 
Step 1: Spatial data and modelling 
In order to implement and evaluate the MIRBAP application, spatial data from various sources 
are required that can be used to make the model-based translation of management into soil 
functions spatially explicit and context specific (Step 2). These essentially refer to 
meteorological, crop and soil data (compare Fig. 1). For the development of spatially 
continuous high-resolution geo-information from raw data from various sources (e.g. soil 
profile description, data from lab analysis, radar measurements), regionalization approaches are 
required that often rely on space-borne remote sensing and involve diverse modelling 
procedures. Models applied to generate spatially distributed rainfall and other climate data 
depend on the temporal and spatial scale, and include empirical statistical models as well as 
models of dynamic meteorology (see Srikanthan and Mcmahon, 2001 for a review). The EU’s 
Sentinel satellite mission produces better temporal data continuity compared to previous 
satellite missions which may allow for the derivation of crop-specific land use classification 
and yield estimation, based on empirical modelling and complex data processing routines 
(Battude et al., 2016; Veloso et al., 2017). 
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Spatial soil information is often available as conventional polygon maps displaying the spatial 
extent of systematic units. However, as soil map development heavily relies on the individual 
soil surveyor’s expertise, the methodology is not reproducible; spatial aggregation follows 
primarily optical criteria, soil types of different properties and genesis are merged. On the other 
hand, the state-of-the-art empirical modelling approach often relies on the same legacy soil 
databases (Arrouays et al., 2017), but translates expert knowledge on pedogenesis in predictor-
response systems that are fitted by powerful algorithms from machine learning and spatial 
statistics. The approach is known as “digital soil mapping” and includes model performance 
evaluation and the provision of an uncertainty estimate per se. Geo raster data that approximate 
the soil forming factors (parent material, climate, topography, vegetation/land use) are used as 
predictors. They may originate from remote sensing data products and expert-based 
information; see Nussbaum et al. (2018) and Padarian et al. (2019) for recent applications. 
Step 2: Linking management to soil functions 
Within the MIRBAP framework, the above-mentioned geo raster data is used to feed into 
models linking management with environmental objectives. Within BonaRes, a process-based 
soil model called Bodium is currently under development. It attempts to integrate in a systemic 
approach (Vogel et al., 2018) the dominant processes in soils, and thus to facilitate the 
prediction of the multiple consequences of management practices for soil processes and, 
eventually, soil functions. Soil structure dynamics are an integral part of the modelled soil 
system. Plant roots and soil organisms build this structure, while agricultural machines alter it. 
The dynamic soil structure influences water and air distribution and these in turn influence plant 
growth and organism activity. This biotic activity is the basis for nutrient cycling and organic 
matter decomposition, i.e. carbon sequestration and storage. All these processes are site-specific 
and depend on local conditions. These conditions comprise climatic and soil factors that cannot 
be influenced at a medium time scale – they are so-called “inherent soil properties” (Vogel et 
al., 2018). This input is provided by the georeferenced data and modelling synthesized in Step 
1.  
To facilitate the running of Bodium, scenarios are used. Bodium translates management 
changes into outcomes that are evaluated according to the major soil functions: production, 
storage for carbon, storage and filter for water, soil biodiversity, and nutrient cycling. Under 
the assumption that production and nutrient cycling are essentially private goods, they would 
not be used as objectives for a MIRBAP scheme; however, the modelling results with respect 
to these two have obvious relevance for the farmer’s decision to participate in the scheme and, 
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thus, in the sense of a decision support tool. Carbon storage, water buffering for flooding, 
groundwater recharge, nutrient retention and biodiversity are (expressions of) soil functions 
that have clear societal relevance in terms of regulating and supporting ecosystem services, and 
modelled changes in them could therefore be used to determine agri-environmental payments. 
The nature of Bodium, which models multiple soil functions simultaneously, would allow for 
a holistic approach that better takes into account the trade-offs involved than when single 
functions are targeted separately. For instance, there is a well-known trade-off between 
reduction of herbicide use and a corresponding increase in the need for mechanical weeding 
and thus compaction (Böcker et al., 2019). 
Within a MIRBAP scheme, the data and modelling from Steps 1 and 2 would be the basis for 
an online application available to the farmers, also being the source of combined spatial data 
describing a farmer’s land eligible to participate in the agri-environmental payment scheme. 
Optionally, it is thinkable to allow the farmers to correct the data on the basis of standardized 
data input, e.g. from proximate sensors attached to the farmers’ machines. These input data 
would then underlie the Bodium-based modelling. Changes in the soil production function 
would mainly inform the farmer about opportunity costs of the available actions. Changes in 
the other, public soil functions though would be the basis for offering payments to the farmer. 
Step 3: Payments 
For each soil function, payment rates per unit increase would be specified, according to which 
the farmers would receive remuneration. Generally, it is an important question for MIRBAP 
and any other result-based scheme how the payment rate per unit of the objective is to be 
determined. From a welfare economic point of view, it would be efficient to remunerate farmers 
for the realization of environmental benefits on the basis of the latter’s marginal social value 
(i.e. shadow price) (Hasund, 2013). Otherwise, there is the risk of underprovision of the 
environmental public good in question.3 On the other hand, however, if the payments are 
significantly higher than the opportunity costs (overcompensation), underprovision may result 
because the scheme funds are limited and more farmers could be enrolled if payments were 
lower (Börner et al., 2017). In the end, “the payment level determines the distribution of net 
gains between [ecosystem service] providers and [ecosystem service] beneficiaries” (Engel, 
2016, p. 139). Of course, shadow prices of environmental public goods (ecosystem services, 
                                                 
3 Also, because non-economic factors also determine the participation in agri-environmental schemes, payments 
alone need not necessarily guarantee socially efficient levels of participation (and, thus, provision of the public 
good) (Bartkowski and Bartke, 2018). 
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biodiversity etc.) can only be roughly approximated by means of economic valuation, and there 
is a general paucity of high-quality valuation studies (e.g. Bartkowski et al., 2015; Förster et 
al., 2019). This also holds in the specific context of soil valuation studies (Bartkowski et al., 
under review; Jónsson and Davíðsdóttir, 2016). As a first step, a MIRBAP scheme targeting 
soil functions may thus rather use payment levels derived from a stakeholder-based negotiation 
process between the farmers and representatives of the wider society or set on the basis of the 
opportunity costs of a typical relevant management action. Eventually, valuation estimates from 
specifically conducted studies could be used to inform the adaptation of payment levels. 
4 Discussion 
In the last section, we presented the idea of a model-informed result-based agri-environmental 
payment (MIRBAP) scheme, both in a more generalized, conceptual form and in a more 
specific context, using an example related to soil functions. It should be noted that in the United 
States, a (pilot) scheme was implemented that is consistent with the MIRBAP principles as 
described above. It had been developed by The Nature Conservancy within a Strategic 
Agricultural Conservation programme in the Saginaw Bay watershed, Michigan, USA (Fales 
et al., 2016). As part of a large-scale conservation programme, the Great Lakes Watershed 
Management System (GLWMS) was developed, a model-based online decision support tool. 
Among other uses, the GLWMS was the basis for a pay-for-performance (i.e. result-based) pilot 
programme, with payments provided for various management practices on the basis of their 
model-estimated effects on water quality. In this section, we would like to go beyond the 
quantitative results and scarce discussion provided by Fales et al. (2016), and discuss the 
general advantages and disadvantages of MIRBAP. To guide the discussion, we use a set of 
policy evaluation criteria informed by the literature on agri-environmental schemes and 
payments for ecosystem services (of which the former are a particular instance) (Burton and 
Schwarz, 2013; Engel, 2016; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). Table 1 summarizes the comparison 
of MIRBAP with conventional action-based and result-based schemes (based on the authors’ 
assessment and expertise). 
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Table 1: Relative performance of action-based, result-based and MIRBAP schemes. 
Note: This is a purely relative scale where green indicates the best relative performance with respect to 
a criterion, yellow is 2nd best and orange is 3rd best. If two scheme types are tied according to a 
criterion, there no orange coding is used (only green and yellow). 
Criterion Action-based Result-based MIRBAP 
Outcome certainty    
Payment certainty    
Additionality    
Cost-effectiveness    
Dynamic efficiency    
Farmer autonomy    
Multiple objectives    
Long-term objectives    
4.1 Outcome certainty 
From the point of view of society and the regulator (but also the intrinsically motivated farmer) 
the environmental effectiveness of applied measures, i.e. outcome certainty, is crucial. In this 
respect, MIRBAP has an obvious advantage as compared to action-based payments – while the 
latter are based on an implicit ‘one-size-fits-all’ assumption, by using spatially explicit data and 
modelling, MIRBAP responds to the challenges of the inherent spatial heterogeneity of 
agroecosystems and farming systems; it is context-specific. Also, when compared with 
conventional result-based payments, where the results are actually measured, modelling has 
advantages over measuring. First, measuring results is very costly in terms of time and 
resources. Instead, the same models can often be applied to large regions; e.g. ICECREAM 
(Rekolainen and Posch, 1993) has been used to model phosphorus leaching with field resolution 
from agricultural land in the whole of Sweden (Johnsson et al., 2008). Thus, models can require 
far less time and resources to cover large areas and many farms. Additionally, as mentioned in 
section 2, models can make predictions for environmental benefits that cannot be measured. 
Further, models make possible anticipating environmental benefits before they are generated 
(ex-ante evaluation). Policy makers can therefore be informed about future environmental 
benefits on a field level. For this, it is necessary that models forecast at an adequate temporal 
and spatial resolution to allow policy makers to evaluate the contribution of local actions to the 
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probability of reaching environmental goals, and use such information to plan future 
commitments. 
However, one must say that a MIRBAP scheme is only as good as the model(s) underlying it. 
The uncertainty of model predictions will vary between different environmental benefits. For 
example, models with good precision and accuracy have been used to predict the impact of 
agricultural practices on greenhouse gas emissions (Weiske et al., 2006), buffer strips in 
preventing nutrient emissions from leading to downstream eutrophication (White and Arnold, 
2009) and the impact of various agricultural practices on water quality (Fales et al., 2016) or 
the provision of soil functions (see section 3.2). Other environmental benefits are more difficult 
to model. For example, the extinction rate of species is inherently stochastic and can hardly be 
modelled without a discouragingly wide range of possible outcomes (Ludwig, 1999). 
Whether the modelled result-based system leads to attainment of society’s environmental goals 
in the long-run will depend on the accuracy of the predictions. Each model is calibrated and 
evaluated based on measurements – therefore, modelling generally cannot be more precise than 
measurement. This can only be the case when the model is applied to an area for which 
measurement is impractical (assuming that other conditions for model application are met). 
Furthermore, since models required for both Step 1 and Step 2 of a MIRBAP scheme are likely 
to be complex and data-intensive, possible errors propagate throughout the modelling chain. 
They comprise uncertainties of the original input data, the models involved in spatially 
continuous data generation, the applied process models simulating the system dynamics, and 
the assessment scheme of the model outputs. Therefore, uncertainties in the obtained 
predictions have to be quantified. By quantifying uncertainty, models also make possible the 
integration of uncertainty in decision-making. Policy makers can adjust the payment so that it 
is higher when the uncertainty is low, and vice versa, to account for the risk that the envisaged 
outcome is not reached despite payments being made. In comparison, the correlative uncertainty 
between measured indicators and desired results in conventional result-based schemes is not 
quantified and thus cannot be used to improve decision making. 
As a way to further deal with uncertainty, schemes can include both measured and modelled 
mechanisms. For instance, farmers can be paid for their modelled nutrient pollution abatement, 
which would be difficult to measure on a farm level. The water quality can then be measured 
for the entire watershed area to validate the aggregated predicted pollution abatement, and the 
model improved thereafter.  
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4.2 Payment certainty 
One of the main advantages of action-based payment schemes over result-based payments is, 
from the perspective of the participating farmers, that they offer the certainty of payment – if 
farmers sign up for a scheme and apply the agreed-upon management actions, they will be paid. 
Meanwhile, in a result-based scheme, the payment is conditional on achieving the result – 
which, however, is not only influenced by the actions of the farmer, but also by various external 
factors such as extreme weather events, unexpected pest infestations, the actions of neighbours 
etc. Payment uncertainty is one of the areas in which MIRBAP scores better than conventional 
result-based payments – since payments are based on ex-ante results of modelling, payment is 
as certain as in the case of action-based schemes. In this sense, MIRBAP combines two main 
advantages of result-based and action-based schemes, respectively: while offering greater 
outcome certainty to society than action-based payments (though less than is the case in a 
conventional result-based scheme), it also provides similar payment certainty to the farmer. 
4.3 Additionality 
Additionality is a common condition in evaluations of PES schemes (Engel, 2016). In a 
MIRBAP scheme, the model would compare the status quo with a change. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that payments will be provided for results that would have been achieved (or were 
already achieved) in the absence of the scheme. While this could similarly be done in result-
based schemes where the results are measured, by comparing the environmental outcomes 
before and after enrolling in a scheme, result-based schemes generally only consider results 
after enrolling, without much regard to how it compares to the status quo. The additionality of 
action-based is unknown since the results are not quantified. Using the status quo as a baseline 
in MIRBAP may however imply moral hazard – by creating an incentive to downgrade land 
before entering the scheme in order to achieve a higher increment (and thus higher payment). 
The alternative would be to use some general baseline, such as “good agricultural practice” for 
the land in question – here, the downside would be the potential inefficiency due to paying for 
non-additional effects (windfall gain), if the actual status quo is above the baseline. 
Furthermore, this approach would require the definition of a general standard to be used as a 
baseline – thus counteracting the context-specific nature of result-based payments. Eventually, 
it is an empirical question which variant is likely to be less problematic and more practicable. 
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4.4 Cost effectiveness 
From a theoretical point of view, result-based payments are generally considered more cost-
effective than action-based payments, especially under the assumption that information 
asymmetries are limited and the regulator is able to perfectly monitor the results (Melkonyan 
and Taylor, 2013; White and Hanley, 2016). Spatial targeting can, principally, improve cost 
effectiveness in both types of schemes with near-perfect information availability to the regulator 
(Drechsler et al., 2016; Engel, 2016). However, the regulator usually has limited knowledge of 
the cost structures of individual farms. Result-based payments are expected to solve this 
information asymmetry, because payments are only provided in exchange for the provision of 
environmental benefits (Burton and Schwarz, 2013). Since rational farmers will only implement 
measures that are profitable/utility-improving (i.e., do not generate a net loss/dis-utility) to 
them, they will implement measures until the Equi-marginal Principle for cost effectiveness is 
satisfied across all farms. Preliminary assessments of existing result-based schemes have 
corroborated this theoretical prediction (Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; White and Sadler, 2012). 
In contrast, action-based schemes are highly cost-ineffective, as the underlying uniform 
payments do not reflect spatial heterogeneity in costs and benefits, thereby making it impossible 
to achieve cost effectiveness (see section 4.1 on their generally questionable effectiveness). In 
this context, MIRBAP is largely comparable with conventional result-based schemes. The 
information asymmetries due to unknown costs remain, but the regulator can predict the results 
(outcomes) of different management actions implemented by farmers. Offered a payment per 
unit for the desired results, rational farmers will, as in a measured result-based scheme, be 
incentivized to equalize their marginal costs of implementing measures with the level of the 
payment, thereby guaranteeing cost effectiveness of achieving the predicted results. In this way, 
MIRBAP achieves spatial targeting of measures without the regulator needing to know the costs 
for individual farms. Rather, by serving farmers with context-sensitive, spatially explicit 
modelling, the translation of management choices into environmental effects will ensure the 
choice of cost-effective measures (because accurately modelled results will incentivize the 
farmer to minimize their costs in the same way as measured results do).  
This relates to another issue, namely that MIRBAP is essentially a combination of action-based 
and result-based elements, and thus invites one to ask whether it would not be better to have an 
action-based scheme in which the regulator uses the model to inform farmers how much they 
will be paid for particular measures on their farm. There are three strong arguments speaking 
against this. First, individualizing payments for measures in this way contradicts the basic 
characteristic of an action-based scheme, that of a uniform payment for the same measure. 
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Second, it reduces the transparency of the scheme, in that the farmer will need to rely 
completely on the authorities’ determination of measures and payments. Third, relatedly, it 
would remove the need for the farmer to understand the environmental consequences of their 
actions. Thus, it would maintain the feeling of being controlled by a central power rather than 
being empowered (Rode et al., 2015). Both would likely reduce the potential environmental 
benefits of a MIRBAP scheme by reducing participation and increasing administration costs in 
an essentially top-down designed scheme. Overall, we believe that the capacity to increase 
farmer engagement in environmental management is an extremely valuable characteristic of a 
result-based scheme such as our MIRBAP concept (see also 4.6 below). Although difficult to 
quantify, it is nevertheless potentially easy to eliminate the potential for engagement through 
insufficient care for farmers’ perceptions of a system design. 
4.5 Dynamic efficiency 
An obvious downside of action-based payments is that they offer few incentives to innovate – 
since the payment is tied to a specific management action, it is rational for the participating 
farmer to stick to this action. Conversely, since the farmer is rewarded on an annually recurring 
basis for (measured or predicted) results, a result-based payment creates an incentive to consider 
ways of improving the effectiveness of environmentally beneficial management practices in the 
future, because the more effective a given practice or the lower the cost of implementing it, the 
higher the farmer’s future profits. The effectiveness of practices can be influenced in two ways. 
Either through innovations that improve the practices or through technical changes in 
agriculture that indirectly affect the environmental performance of a management practice, 
where the effect could be negative. There is broad evidence that environmental taxes and 
payments in other sectors that are based on results, e.g. air-pollution taxes, are a catalyst for 
technical change that has substantially reduced the costs of environmental improvements, while 
action-based schemes have the least potential to promote dynamic efficiency (Requate, 2005). 
Furthermore, any result-based scheme has greater potential to engage farmers in environmental 
stewardship by offering a pecuniary reward for being knowledgeable of environmental impacts 
or being innovative. Farmers have over the centuries shown great creativity and innovation to 
improve the effectiveness of agriculture, because their livelihood has depended on it. Given that 
a MIRBAP scheme creates a link between environmental effectiveness and livelihoods, one can 
expect the scheme to promote the desire for learning (through, e.g., experimenting with the 
model) and harness their innovative capacity for resolving environmental problems. 
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Nevertheless, MIRBAP scores less well in terms of dynamic efficiency than conventional 
result-based schemes that rely on measurement. Farmers cannot benefit from innovation if the 
environmental benefits from such innovation cannot be modelled. Innovation is only 
theoretically possible if a farmer suggests something that can be modelled easily. However, in 
general it takes several years of research to develop a model to predict effects of practices with 
acceptable uncertainty. More realistically, farmers can instead be engaged in the model-
building process and contribute before the scheme is launched. It has been shown that 
stakeholders who participate in model building for environmental decision-making contribute 
with information, novel ideas and solutions (Beierle, 2002), increased acceptance and uptake 
of modelled results (Wassen et al., 2011) and improved environmental outcomes (Brody, 2003). 
This can also help the modellers understand the context and management practices for which 
they model the outcomes, while also helping the policy makers and farmers understand what is 
feasible to model and under what uncertainty (Addison et al., 2013). Moreover, environmental 
management, as well as agricultural management are annually recurring processes. If farmers 
are provided with a mechanism to feed into model improvement, so that they can expect 
innovations to be included in the model over time, then the system would promote dynamic 
efficiency, though with a time lag.  
Time lags are characteristic of the diffusion of technological developments in agriculture 
generally, hence the inability for immediate introduction of environmental innovations should 
not pose a significant disadvantage, if the long-term advantages can be perceived by farmers. 
A mechanism to involve farmers in further model development (see step 5 in Figure 1) could 
also promote farmer collaboration and the sharing of ideas, which is known to be important for 
innovation (Darnhofer et al., 2010; Mills et al., 2019). For example, if the introduction of a 
proposal for model improvement requires a minimum level of consensus among farmers, it 
should encourage dialogue amongst farmers and modellers through e.g. facilitation activities. 
Conversely, it is an open question how willing farmers would be to “play around” with the 
MIRBAP tool and to participate in its further development (e.g. adding new practices to the 
modelled portfolio). The challenge here is mainly how to best give opportunities to farmers and 
other stakeholders to provide input into further model development.  
Relatedly, it is important to minimize reporting and data input required from farmers to feed 
the model – in some cases GIS layers with currently available data may be too imprecise for 
application in heterogeneous areas. Given the rise of precision farming technologies and 
digitalization of agriculture (Finger et al., 2019; Weersink et al., 2018), data may be provided 
by the farmers themselves. Then, standards would be needed to ensure valid model results. 
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4.6 Autonomy and non-pecuniary motives 
It is a general advantage of result-based schemes that they are consistent with farmers’ 
preference for making their own decisions about how to manage their land, including 
management for environmental objectives. Thus, result-based schemes not only give room for 
immaterial benefits of a feeling of agency and autonomy, but also allow for using relevant local 
knowledge (e.g. Riley, 2016; Stupak et al., 2019). In this respect, MIRBAP has both a relative 
advantage and a disadvantage as compared to measurement-based schemes. 
First, the MIRBAP interface is not only useful in the context of the payment scheme itself – but 
also has the character of a decision support tool, though one focusing strongly on environmental 
effects of agricultural management practices (cf. Fales et al., 2016). In this sense, MIRBAP has 
the appeal of combining a policy instrument with a decision support tool that would support the 
farmers in their pursuit of both private and public goals. Furthermore, by linking management 
choices to their environmental effects, MIRBAP would facilitate the consideration of non-
pecuniary motives by farmers, who may make decisions not only on the basis of profit 
maximization (Bartkowski and Bartke, 2018). This is a significant advantage as compared to 
action-based payment schemes, in which knowledge about the effects of practices by individual 
farmers is not usually available to them, so it is rational for the farmer to focus on pecuniary 
rewards. Having access to the model would enable the farmer to experiment and thereby learn 
from the predicted results of different actions. Normally, farmers are not provided with 
individual feedback on the environmental consequences of their management choices in an 
action-based scheme, which deadens engagement. Further, this step is crucial for building trust 
in the system, because it is more transparent than a government expert running the model and 
telling farmers what they can do (as we also point out in relation to cost effectiveness in section 
4.4), instead of farmers telling the government what they are willing to do. 
However, for reasons already discussed with respect to dynamic efficiency, MIRBAP is still 
more restrictive than a conventional result-based scheme because it only allows for 
management changes that are and can be modelled. Therefore, the autonomy of the participating 
farmers is not as high, though still higher than in the case of action-based schemes. 
4.7 Multiple and long-term objectives 
There is an increasing number of models that allow taking into account multiple environmental 
effects (e.g. ecosystem service bundles), thus supporting the analysis of trade-offs between 
different objectives. Using such multi-objective models to support a MIRBAP scheme (see also 
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section 3.2) would allow regulators to provide more “holistic” incentives, focusing on the 
interactions between different environmental objectives rather than treating each of them 
separately (or some of them not at all, e.g. due to prohibitive costs of measurement). 
Furthermore, it would enable and support farmers in choosing management approaches that 
improve multiple ecosystem services simultaneously – while also making them aware of the 
trade-offs involved. Relatedly, the MIRBAP framework offers an option for targeting long-term 
processes, for which measurement would imply long time lags. Given the usual contract length 
of five years in the EU, no management practices are currently incentivized whose positive 
environmental impacts take longer. For instance, the effects of practices changing the structural 
development of soils to improve water infiltration and storage or the consequences of crop 
diversification as a substitute for pesticides on soil biology may be detectable only after longer 
periods. Modelling allows predicting the far-into-the-future effects of various practices and 
provide remuneration to farmers accordingly, thus also giving them incentives for longer-term 
investments in changing practices. This would further increase the range of applications and 
their societal relevance in agri-environmental policy. Of course, it would also require longer 
contract lengths to ensure that the changes are not reversed before taking effect. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we introduced a novel conceptual idea for the design of agri-environmental 
payment schemes – model-informed result-based agri-environmental payments (MIRBAP). 
MIRBAP is a combination of design elements, but also of most advantages of conventional 
result-based payments and the payment certainty of action-based schemes. On the one hand, 
the prime advantages of the former would be retained – high environmental effectiveness 
(outcome certainty), cost effectiveness, dynamic efficiency and facilitation of farmers’ 
autonomy. Given high quality models, it can be assumed that on average, the predicted results 
will be realized (with some random variation due to factors such as weather conditions). 
Importantly, the two main practical downsides of result-based schemes (vis-à-vis action-based), 
namely costs of measurement and payment uncertainty for farmers, can be resolved with the 
proposed modelling approach. In the first instance, the need to visit all fields and carry out 
expensive analysis is replaced by modelling results, with measurements restricted to a sample 
of fields for either continual model validation and improvement, or regulatory control. 
Furthermore, since the model would predict the environmental effects ex ante and the payments 
to the farmer would be based on these predictions, there would be no payment uncertainty for 
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the farmer. In this sense, MIRBAP has the potential to reduce outcome uncertainty as compared 
with action-based schemes (from the regulator’s perspective), while also reducing payment 
uncertainty as compared with conventional result-based schemes (from the farmer’s 
perspective). Overall, the MIRBAP scheme would thus improve social welfare. The payment 
would be tied to environmental outcomes and thus would be cost-effective since society would 
only pay for what is actually obtained and farmers would seek the least costly measures to 
obtain the payments. The downside from society’s perspective is that if actual results are lower, 
the real effectiveness of the scheme is reduced. This downside is minimized over time in our 
framework through the design element of continual model validation and development. 
Two major improvements that go beyond conventional action-based or result-based schemes 
are the possibility to address multiple objectives and long-term objectives. As illustrated by 
referring to the modelling framework under development in the BonaRes project, MIRBAP 
would increase the policy relevance of more complex, multi-objective models, e.g. in the 
generally rather neglected context of soil functions. Furthermore, using models also allows to 
take on a longer-term perspective and base payments today on effects that are expected farther 
in the future. 
Our paper offers the conceptual outline of MIRBAP. For it to become a viable option for policy, 
there is a need for further research. First, farmers’ acceptance of and willingness to participate 
in a MIRBAP scheme should be studied – the experience reported by Fales et al. (2016) 
provides first tentative reasons for optimism. Second, the relevance of various models and 
modelling frameworks for MIRBAP should be tested in more detail – the framework has the 
largest potential where measurement is difficult or the achievement of the scheme’s goal is 
highly uncertain for farmers. Third, there is a need for new ways of increasing model robustness 
and flexibility, so as to allow uptake of innovations (to spur dynamic efficiency). Fourth, 
interface solutions should be developed to maximize the usability and attractiveness of 
MIRBAP in practice. This should be informed by farmers’ preferences. Above all, however, 
there is a need for a pilot study applying the MIRBAP principles in a real-world context. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Overview result-based schemes in Europe [source: own elaboration based on EC’s 
inventory, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/rbaps/fiche/map_en.htm] 
Scheme Country/region Indicator 
Golden Eagle conservation 
scheme 
Finland Eagle nests & chicks 
Conservation Performance 
payments 
Sweden Number of lynx and wolverine 
offspring 
Burren Farming for 
Conservation Programme 
Ireland Fields scored (0–10) based on: grazings 
levels, feeding systems, scrub and weed 
encroachment, condition of water 
sources, site integrity 
Farm Conservation Scheme England, UK Indicator plant species (separated into 
five different groups) 
Grassland Bird Protection 
Payments 
(Gemeinschaftlicher 
Wiesenschutz) 
Schleswig-
Holstein, 
Germany 
Presence of breeding birds, number of 
clutches per hectare 
Harrier nest protection in 
arable fields 
Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 
Germany 
Presence of nests of Montague’s Harrier 
or Marsh Harrier 
Maintenance of species rich 
grassland 
Germany, 
various federal 
states 
Minimum number of four indicator 
species from a regional list present (or 
more for higher payments) 
Maintenance of traditional 
orchards 
Germany, 
various federal 
states 
Payment per tree (nut or fruit) of a 
certain minimum size to a max density 
of 100 trees per ha 
Species rich grassland Rheinland-Pfalz, 
Germany 
Presence of a minimum of 4–8 indicator 
species from catalogue in each third of a 
transect across the parcel 
On-farm conservation of rare EU Number of heads of breeding female or 
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and endangered local animal 
breeds 
male animals and offspring (with 
breeding recorded) 
Species rich grassland scheme 
(MEKA programme B4) 
Baden-
Württemberg, 
Germany 
Presence of a minimum of 4 indicator 
species (28 key flower species or 
genera) from catalogue in each third of 
a transect across the parcel 
Results-based nature 
conservation plan 
(Ergebnsiorientierter 
Naturschutzplan) 
Austria Individually set results and control 
criteria for each parcel (High Nature 
Value farmland) 
Species rich vineyards 
(Rebflächen mit natürlicher 
Arten- und Strukturvielfalt) 
Switzerland Individual scores: indicator species and 
structural criteria (stone walls, 
individual trees, wildflower areas) 
Preservation and enhancement 
of species rich grassland 
(Öko-Qualitätsverordnung 
ÖQV – Ecological 
Compensation Areas) 
Switzerland Presence of a minimum of 6 indicator 
species from catalogue in a 6 metre 
diameter circle 
Species rich grassland 
programme (Flowering 
Meadows Scheme) 
France Presence of (a minimum of) 4 plant 
species from a list 
Pastoral management plan 
(Gestion pastorale) 
France Change in vegetation state (assessed 
against photographic reference 
information), management actions to be 
undertaken by farmers defined at each 
site 
RAPCA (Red de Áreas Pasto-
Cortafuegos de Andalucía 
(managing firebreaks)) 
Andalucía, 
Spain 
Evaluation of overall vegetation 
structure, visual assessment of how 
much of individual shrubs have been 
consumed, overall consumption of 
herbaceous layer 
Per Clutch Trials Netherlands Number of clutches 
Meadow bird agreement with 
agri-environment cooperatives 
Netherlands Number of bird nests 
Meadow bird agreements 
(2000-2006) 
Netherlands Number of breeding pairs per ha 
Species rich grassland and 
arable botanical management 
agreements (2000-2006) 
Netherlands Number of domestic plant species 
according to agreement (10, 15, 20 
different grassland species per 25 sqm) 
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